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A Video Steganography Attack Using
Multi-Dimensional Discrete Spring Transform
Aaron Sharp, Qilin Qi, Yaoqing Yang, Dongming Peng, and Hamid Sharif

Abstract-Video steganography is fast emerging as a next
generation steganographic medium that ofTers many advantages
over traditional steganographic cover media such as audio and
images.

Various schemes have recently emerged which take

advantage of video specific properties for information hiding,
most notably through the use of motion vectors. Although many
steganographic schemes have been proposed which exploit several
possible steganographic domains within video sequences, few
attacks have been proposed to combat such schemes, and no
current attacks have been shown to be capable of defeating
multiple schemes at once.
In this paper, we will further expand upon our proposed
Discrete Spring Transform (DST) steganographic attack. We will
explore further applications of the transform and how it may be
used to defeat multiple steganographic schemes, specifically cur
rent video steganography schemes. The effectiveness of the pro
posed algorithm will be shown by attacking a multi-dimensional
steganographic algorithm embedded in video sequences, where
the scheme operates in two different dimensions of the video. The
attack is successful in defeating multiple steganographic schemes
verified by determining the BER after DST attack which always
remains approximately 0.5. Furthermore, the attack preserves the
integrity of the video sequence which is verified by determining
the PSNR which always remains approximately above 30dB.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Digital Steganography is often considered a game of cat and
mouse between steganographer and attacker, where the two are
constantly at odds attempting to defeat each other. In the last
several decades, the capacity and prevalence of steganographic
cover media has increased dramatically almost entirely as a
direct result of the free exchange of media via the internet.
Websites such as Facebook and Flickr are estimated to host
approximately 100 billion and 6 billion images respectively
[1] and Youtube is estimated to host approximately 13 billion
videos [2]. As a result, steganographic attacks that can be ap
plied to a variety of algorithms and cover media are becoming
increasingly important since the sea of potential cover media
is becoming so incredibly vast.
Although countless steganographic attacks have be proposed
to combat a variety of steganographic algorithms [3], [4], [5],
[6], very few attacks are flexible enough to be used outside of
a limited set of algorithms and are typically highly-specialized
to defeat certain types of steganographic algorithms. For exam
ple, we consider the attacks described [3], [4], [5], [6] which
defeat image-steganography, and more specifically, jpeg-based
steganography. None of the attacks found in these surveys
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indicate that they are capable of defeating other types of
image-based steganography, such as spatial techniques, and
even worse none of these attacks appear to be adaptable to
other types of jpeg steganography. It follows that the rigidity
of these attacks is due to the nature of the attack itself,
where nearly all proposed attacks fall into the passive warden
classification as described by the prisoner problem.
The prisoner problem is used to describe steganographic
attacks where attacks fall into one of two categories: passive
warden and active warden. The prisoner problem describes the
process of two prisoners attempting to communicate secretly
by sending hidden messages through a warden [7], [4], [3].
The warden's responsibility is to discover andlor destroy the
hidden message. A passive warden attack describes the sce
nario where the warden monitors messages and only acts if the
message appears to contain hidden data [4], [3]. Conversely,
an active warden attack describes the scenario where the
warden actively attempts to destroy or uncover the hidden data,
regardless of the appearance of the message [4], [3].
The problem with passive warden attacks is that they
are most often highly specific to a certain steganographic
algorithms within a specific type of cover media [4], [3]. It is
typically the case that such attacks look at certain attributes
of the cover media to determine if a certain algorithm has
been used or if the statistics of the cover media have been
disturbed in a manner that suggests steganographic data is
present [8], [9]. It is clear to see that such attacks would be
ineffective against those algorithms or cover media which have
not been fully studied, as it is impossible to predict attributes
of unknown attacks. For this reason, we believe that the
only truly adaptable steganographic attacks utilize the active
warden model. We have previously described the Discrete
Spring Transform (DST) which is an active warden attack
that is capable of disrupting next-generation steganographic
algorithms [10]. In this paper, we intend to further expand
upon the DST attack and demonstrate how it may be further
applied to other next-generation steganographic schemes.
The paper is described as follows: Previous Works, which
briefly introduces the Discrete Spring Transform and Video
Steganography; System Architecture and Methodology, which
mathematically describes further applications of the Discrete
Spring Transform and its applications; Video Steganography,
which describes in detail the specifics of a multi-dimensional
steganography scheme in video sequences; Simulation Results,
which determines the results of the attack on video steganog
raphy; Conclusion, which describes the success of the attack
and further observations.
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II.

PREVIOUS WORKS

Previous works for this paper focus on the discussion of
Discrete Spring Transform (DST) and video steganograhy.
A. Discrete Spring Transform

We have previously described an active warden attack
called the Discrete Spring Transform (DST) [10]. The attack
utilizes spatial transforms to non-linearly distort cover media
in a manner that destroys hidden steganographic data while
preserving the integrity of the cover media. The definition
of DST allows it to be applied to any type of stegrano
graphic algorithm and cover media, which means that DST
offers an extremely flexible and adaptable attack to combat
next-generation steganography. It has been previously shown
that DST may be applied to next-generation steganography
(specifically to combat motion vector steganography) while
preserving the integrity of the cover media. We intend to
further expand the applications of DST to include a more
generalized attack for video steganography.
B.

Video Steganography

While video steganography is a relatively new stegano
graphic medium, there have been some interesting schemes
proposed which encode information in multiple domains of
video sequences. Most of these techniques fall into one of
three categories: 2-dimensional encoding, 3-dimensional en
coding, and multi-dimensional encoding.
1) 2-Dimensional Video Steganography: 2-Dimensional
video steganography refers to any techniques which may be
used to encode information within individual frames of a
video sequence using image-based steganography, example
algorithms may be found in [11], [12], [13]. Since these tech
niques only operate 2-dimensionally within individual frames
of the video sequence, the term 2-dimensional steganography
is appropriate. There is nothing gained over image normal
image-based steganography from using this technique as the
strength of the algorithms are not enhanced when applied to
video.
2) 3-Dimensional Video Steganography: 3-dimensional
video steganography refers to techniques which attempt to
encode information using a third dimension of the video
sequence, such as time or motion vectors.
With time-based steganography, information may be spread
in time by altering only certain frames, or sections of frames
within a video sequence using image-based steganography.
The advantage to this approach is that only a fraction of the
possible frames and data are encoded, making steganographic
attacks difficult since most of the video sequence will not
contain any steganographic data. As a result, many stegano
graphic attacks that take advantage of predefined statistics
within image or video sequences would likely fail since the
encoded video largely retains the same metrics as the original
sequence.
Motion vector steganography encodes information within
the motion vectors of a video sequence typically by inter
cepting the motion estimation block (as found in popular

video compression algorithms) and altering motion vectors
in a certain way [14], [15], [16], [17]. This technique uti
lizes motion between frames which is also considered a 3dimensional medium for encoding. This attack is unique in
that it takes advantage of a video-specific medium to encode
information, meaning that image-based steganographic attacks
are inadequate to defeat this type of steganography. Currently,
the only observed attacks in literature are passive warden
attacks that are specific to motion vector steganography [18],
[19].
3) Multi-Dimensional
Video
Steganography:
Multidimensional video steganography refers to a combination
of 2-Dimensional and 3-Dimensional video steganography.
Multi-dimensional steganography can simultaneously encode
information in both the 3D and 2D sections of video, resulting
in an extremely large capacity for steganographic data. In
fact, often both techniques can be encoded independently of
each other, meaning it is possible to encode two different
sequences of information in two different domains of the
video simultaneously. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of
how 2D and 3D video steganography can both be applied to
a video sequence. In this sample scheme, each frame of the
video is encoded using standard image-based steganography
(this frame is called the IFrame). Next, the next frame in
the sequence (called the PFrame) is used to perform motion
estimation from the IFrame. The PFrame is altered using
motion-vector steganography to encode information. The
cycle is then repeated by advancing the sequence using
the PFrame as the new IFrame. The result of this type of
encoding is that there is no current steganographic attack that
can simultaneously address the 2D and 3D encoding in the
video sequence. For this reason, we have chosen to attack
multi-dimensional video steganography using our multi
dimensional DST to show how our attack can simultaneously
defeat two different types of steganography schemes.
III.

We will now formally describe the definition of Discrete
Spring Transform and some sample applications for specific
types of cover media. The definition of the Discrete Spring
Transform is independent of any specific steganographic al
gorithm and can be applied to any type of cover media in
n-dimensional space.
A. Discrete Spring Transform

Let C be an n-dimensional cover media defined as:
C

=

F(x , y , z , ...)

(1)

where

x , y , z , ... E

Z

(2)

and the number of parameters in F(x, y, z, ... ) is n.
Then the Discrete Spring Transform for a cover media C
and attacked cover media 6 may be described as follows:
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C

=

F(x , y , z , ...)

-+

AF(lax J , lby J , lcz J , . . . )

=

6 (3)
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and fn(x , y) is any non-linear time-variant function.
C. DST for Video Media

Define an M x N x F video (consisting of a sequence of F
M x N gray-scale images) as a cover media V = F(x , y , z),
where the number of pixels in x is M, the number of pixels
in y is N, and the number of frames is F.
The DST is then realized as:

Motion
Estimation
--�

Encoded
I-Frame

--�
--�
--�

P-Frame
,,

�

" -- ...-P "...
\
, ! \

V=F(x ,

,

�

y , z)

P-Frame
--�
---�

a=f2(x , y , z)
b=h(x , y , z)

\

I

,

and fn(x , y , z) is any non-linear time-variant function.

.

IV. VIDEO S T EGANOGRAPHY AT TACK

Video Steganography Encoding

�

1

and are defined as:

A=JI(x , y , z , ...)
a=f2(x , y , z , ...)
b=h(x , y , z , ...)

(4)

c=f4(X , y , z , ...)
...=fn(x , y , z , ...)
The strength of the Discrete Spring Transform lies in the
definition of fn(x , y , z , ...), which we define as any non-linear
and time-variant function. Unlike simple RST transforms, the
non-linearity of the DST is applied to each dimension of the
image.
B.

DST for Image Media

Define an M x N pixel gray-scale image I as a cover media
y), where the number of pixels in x is M, and the
number of pixels in y is N.
The DST is then realized as:
I = F(x ,

1=F(x , y)

-t

AF(lax J , lby J )=j

(5)

where A, a, b are defined as:

A=JI(x , y)
a=f2(x , y)
b=h(x , y)

(6)

As other steganographers have observed, video steganog
raphy is fast becoming an interesting new steganographic
medium which has enormous capacity compared with tradi
tional steganographic cover mediums [14], [15], [16], [17],
[11]. For this reason, we have chosen to apply our multi
dimensional DST attack to video steganography. We have
chosen to attack a scheme which encodes information in
multiple steganographic domains of the video sequence, us
ing image-based steganography and motion-vector steganog
raphy. Figure 1 describes the process of encoding informa
tion in the video sequence where information is encoded 2dimensionally within individual frames of the video, as well
as 3-dimensionally within the motion vectors of the video. We
believe this scheme represents a robust system that would be
exceptionally difficult to combat using existing steganographic
attacks.
Our attack will utilize 2D and Time (3D) DST attacks to
combat the multi-dimensional video steganography scheme.
Figure 2 describes the process of attacking the video sequence
as follows: First, the video sequence is decomposed into a train
of 2D images or frames. Next each frame of the sequence is
attacked using the 2D DST transform. Lastly, this resultant
sequence is attacked using the Time (3D) DST attack. The
semantics of the 2D and Time (3D) DST attacks are described
in the following sections.
A. 2D DST Attack

The 2-dimensional DST attack has been previously de
scribed in [10], where the attack was applied to individual
frames of a video sequence. The 2D DST attack can more
generally be defined as an operation which will spatially distort
media that can be expressed 2-dimensionally using a nonlinear
spatial transform. Various algorithms may be applied which fit
the criteria of a 2D DST attack, however, for simplicity we
will focus on attacking the media using a 'pinch' attack, where
individual sections of two-dimensional media are stretched and
184
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(8)

c=f4(X , y , z)

No

,, -. --...
'. .... -\

Finished

and A, a, b, c, . . .

(7)

A=JI(x , y , z)

--

Fig. 1.

AF(lax J , lby J , lcz J )= V

where A, a, b, c are defined as:

Modified

Encoded
I-Frame
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Original Video Sequence

Time Expansion

Motion
Estimation P-Frame
-------.

Encoded

-

I-Frame

-

-� '..

I

��

..

-

O ST Time Attack

3D (Time)

V.

DSTAttack

A. 2D DST BER

O ST Video Steganography Attack

Table I shows the BER for the 2D steganographic scheme
under the multi-dimensional DST attack. As evident, the BER
of the 2D steganographic scheme was increased dramatically
with the 2D and Time DST attack. The table indicates that
the 2D DST attack was much more successful in destroying
the steganographic media than was the Time DST attack,
however, even for a modest 2D DST attack the BER increases
to approximately 0.5 which is shown in highlight.

other sections are compressed. The net effect of this nonlinear
spatial attack is that the media retains some slight distortion
but is effective in destroying most hidden steganographic
data while maintaining an acceptable PSNR. This attack has
been proven to be effective at combating complicated cover
media such as video sequences, and will be part of the multi
dimensional Spring attack.

Q.
0
..c

DST Time Attack

The DST Time attack is in principle identical to the 2D
DST attack but is implemented in the third dimension of the
steganographic media rather than the second dimension. It is
understood that this attack can only be applied to those types
of cover-media which exhibit at least three dimensions, such
as video sequences. For a video sequence, this attack can be
thought of as affecting the time or framerate, hence the title
DST Time attack. Figure 3 describes the process of a simple
DST Time attack, where a video sequence is first arbitrarily
split into two video sequences. Next, each of these sequences
is stretched or compressed via 3-dimensional interpolation in
the time dimension. The result is that the number of frames in
one sequence is decreased while the number of frames in the
other sequence is increased. The resulting sequences are then
combined to form a video sequence that has the same number
of frames as the original sequence. This attack will be applied
as part of the multi-dimensional Spring attack.

u�
'"
'" E
E "

�e

0
5
10
15
20
25

0
0.0003
0.0006
0.00 10
0.00 10
0.00 10
0.00 13

10
0. 1020
0. 1033
0. 1043
0. 1052
0. 1043
0. 1087

20 Chop
20
0.5351
0.5364
0.54 18
0.5402
0.5450
0.542 1

(pixels)
30
0.5 195
0.52 14
0.5236
0.5293
0.5332
0.5360

40
0.5 185
0.5077
0.5086
0.5140
0.5057
0.506 1

50
0.46 1 1
0.453 1
0.4557
0.4534
0.4544
0.4585

TABLE I
20 STEGANOGRAPHY BER

B.

Time (3D) DST BER

Table II shows the BER for the motion vector scheme
under the multi-dimensional DST attack. It can be seen that
the BER of the 3D steganographic scheme was increased
significantly under either the 2D or Time DST attack. Unlike
the 2D steganographic scheme, both the 2D and Time DST
attacks were equally successful in combating the motion
vector steganography, as evidenced by the fact both schemes
successfully increase the BER to 0.5 dB.
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SIMUL ATION RESULT S

The results of our multi-dimensional DST attack indi
cate that our attack is successful in destroying the hidden
steganographic data while maintaining acceptable quality of
the cover-media. The BER for both the 2D and motion vector
steganography schemes were calculated separately according
to the strength of the 2D and Time DST attack.

Finished

B.

/ / /J

/��j/"

Fig. 3.

Fig. 2.

Time DSTAttack
Video Sequence
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